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Romano v. Romano, 138 Nev. Adv. Op. 1 (Jan. 13, 2022)1
FAMILY LAW: THE TEST FOR JOINT OR PRIMARY PHYSICAL CUSTODY
ARRAGNEMENTS

Summary
Caselaw surrounding the circumstances under which a district court may modify the joint
physical custody of minor children and a parent’s child-support obligations has been inconsistent
in Nevada. In Rivero,2 for example, the Court relied on two tests to evaluate motions to modify a
physical custody arrangement. Initially, Traux held that the test to modify joint physical custody
arrangements was different from the test to modify primary physical custody.3 The initial test was
based on NRS 125.510(2), which provided that a court may modify a joint physical custody
arrangement when the movant can show that it is in the child’s best interest to do so. Thus, the
Court initially concluded that a party does not need to show a change in the parent’s circumstances
to modify a joint physical custody arrangement. 4 Even when Traux was decided, the child’s best
interest was the sole factor in determining physical custody, regardless of whether a party sought
joint or primary custody.
However, the Court later observed that when a judge makes a decision on child custody, it
should not be modified if the circumstances that were present when the decision was made remains
in effect.5 As such, the Court modified the physical custody arrangement test. The Court held that
requiring the movant to show a substantial change in circumstances affecting a child’s welfare
“serves the important purpose of guaranteeing stability unless circumstances have changed to such
an extent that a modification is appropriate.” 6 Accordingly, a court may modify a joint or primary
physical custody arrangement only when “(1) there has been a substantial change in circumstances
affecting the welfare of the child, and (2) the child’s best interest is served by the modification.” 7

Background
In 2019, appellant Aaron Romano and respondent Tracy Romano divorced. The parties
agreed to create a timeshare regarding the physical custody of their seven children. According to
the timeshare, Aaron would hold custody of the oldest three children for approximately 90 percent
of the time. Tracy, on the other hand, would hold custody of the four younger children for
approximately 95 percent of the time. The timeshare did not meet the at-least-40-percent-physicalcustody standard for joint physical custody; regardless, the parties agreed to joint physical custody.
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After the parties resolved custody, they stipulated to a Marital Settlement Agreement
(MSA). The MSA provided that Aaron owed Tracy $1,138 per month per child. The MSA also
provided that the prevailing party in litigation concerning the terms and conditions of the MSA, or
its breach, is entitled to attorney fees and costs.
Roughly eight months after stipulating to the MSA, Aaron filed a “Motion to Confirm De
Facto Physical Custody Arrangement of Children.” He requested that the court modify the custody
order to reflect his status as having primary physical custody of the three oldest children and
Tracy’s status as having primary physical custody of the four youngest children. He also requested
that the court modify the child-support obligations based on the actual physical custody timeshare
and Tracy’s monthly income increase.
Tracy opposed Aaron’s motion, arguing that their settlement did not warrant a
modification. Specifically, Tracy argued that there were no changed circumstances and that the
settlement reflected what Tracy and Aaron contemplated and stipulated to in court. As to her
income, Tracy argued that there was no change in circumstances because her income was part of
the parties’ global settlement agreement, which Aaron knew of at the time they agreed on child
support.
The district court concluded that there was no change in circumstances warranting the
modification in custody and that Tracy’s income had not changed. The court denied Aaron’s
motion and awarded Tracy attorney fees and costs pursuant to the MSA and NRS 18.010(2)(b).
Aaron appealed from both of the district court’s orders.

Discussion
The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Aaron’s motion to modify custody
The Court held that a court may modify a joint or primary physical custody arrangement
only when “(1) there has been a substantial change in circumstances affecting the welfare of the
child, and (2) the child’s best interest is served by the modification.” 8 Applying this analysis, the
Court discerned no abuse of discretion in the district court’s holding that there was no change in
circumstances warranting a modification of the child-custody arrangement. Aaron did not allege
or show a substantial change in circumstances affecting the welfare of the children since the
arrangement was agreed upon.
However, Aaron argues that Rivero requires the district court to rely on the stipulated
custody order to determine whether it qualifies as joint custody before it may reject a motion to
modify based on a lack of changed circumstances. The Court held that Aaron’s argument is
premised on the existence of two separate tests used to evaluate a motion to modify physical
custody. Thus, the Court overrules Rivero’s holding to the extent that a district court must first
determine the type of physical custody arrangement before considering whether to modify it. As
such, the Court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Aaron’s motion
based on his failure to show a substantial change in circumstances without having first determined
if the parties were exercising primary or joint physical custody.
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The district court did not abuse its discretion when it denied Aaron’s motion to modify his childsupport obligation
Aaron argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motion to modify
his child-support obligations based on Tracy’s income increase. Aaron further argues that the
district court should have reviewed the child-support order based on changed circumstances
concerning Tracy’s income. However, the Court held that Tracy’s income and Aaron’s childsupport obligation were both resolved in the MSA. Thus, Tracy’s income at the time the parties
resolved the child support was $6,018.67, and her income had not changed since then. As such,
the district court did not abuse its discretion when it concluded Tracy’s income did not constitute
a change in circumstances to justify modifying Aaron’s support obligation.
Aaron next relies on NAC Chapter 425 and 425.170(3) to argue that a change in the law
made after entry of a support obligation amounts to a changed circumstance, justifying a
modification of that obligation. However, the Court held that, while Rivero and Burton provide
that a district court may modify a support order when there is a legal change in circumstances, the
promulgated regulation sets out a minor exception to the rule. 9 Further, the regulation is not invalid
because it does not violate the constitution, conflict with existing statutory provisions, or is
otherwise arbitrary and capricious. As such, NAC 425.170(3) does not exceed the scope of the
Administrator of the Division of Welfare and Support Services, and the district court did not abuse
its discretion in concluding that there was no change in circumstances justifying a modification of
Aaron’s child-support obligations.

Conclusion
The Court held that a district court may modify a joint physical custody arrangement only
when (1) there has been a substantial change in circumstances affecting the welfare of the child
and (2) the modification would serve the child’s best interest. The Court held that the district court
did not abuse its discretion when it concluded that no substantial change in circumstances occurred
that would affect the welfare of the children. As such, the Court affirmed the district court’s order
denying Aaron’s motion to modify his child-support obligation.
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